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Abstract There is a growing assumption that payments
for environmental services including carbon sequestra-
tion and greenhouse gas emission reduction provide an
opportunity for poverty reduction and the enhancement
of sustainable development within integrated natural
resource management approaches. Yet in experiential
terms, community-based natural resource management
implementation falls short of expectations in many
cases. In this paper, we investigate the asymmetry
between community capacity and the Land Use Land
Use Change Forestry (LULUCF) provisions of the
Clean Development Mechanism within community
forests in Cameroon. We use relevant aspects of the
Clean Development Mechanism criteria and notions of
‘‘community capacity’’ to elucidate determinants of
community capacity needed for CDM implementation
within community forests. The main requirements are
for community capacity to handle issues of additionality,
acceptability, externalities, certification, and commu-
nity organisation. These community capacity require-
ments are further used to interpret empirically derived
insights on two community forestry cases in Cameroon.
While local variations were observed for capacity
requirements in each case, community capacity was
generally found to be insufficient for meaningful uptake
and implementation of Clean Development Mechanism
projects. Implications for understanding factors that
could inhibit or enhance community capacity for project
development are discussed. We also include recommen-
dations for the wider Clean Development Mechanism/
Kyoto capacity building framework.
Keywords Community capacity  Clean Development
Mechanism  Community forests  Cameroon
Introduction
There is a growing assumption that payments for
environmental services including carbon sequestration
and greenhouse gas emission reduction could provide
an opportunity for poverty reduction and the enhance-
ment of sustainable development within integrated
natural resource management approaches (Asquith
and others 2002; Pagiola and others 2005). Studies have
identified community forest management as a model
that could meet the triple objectives of providing
mechanisms and incentives for community manage-
ment of carbon, forest conservation and local devel-
opment needs (Klooster and Masera 2000;
Poffenberger and others 2002; Smith and Scherr
2003). Yet community-based natural resource manage-
ment performance remains mixed (Agrawal 2001;
Armitage 2005; Barrett and others 2005). This study
seeks to find out whether or not and in what ways
communities currently managing forests in Cameroon
meet the capacity requirements to handle the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects.
The CDM is one of three ‘‘flexible mechanisms’’ in
the Kyoto Protocol designed to accomplish the
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objectives of the UNFCCC. It makes provision for
investment by industrialised countries and industry in
projects related to carbon emissions reduction and
carbon sequestration in developing countries. These
projects should contribute to sustainable development
in developing countries (i.e., Non-Annex 1 countries)
while enabling developed countries (i.e., Annex 1
countries with quantified emission reduction targets)
to meet the Kyoto emission reduction and quantified
emission limitation targets (Art. 12.2 of the Kyoto
Protocol).
Land Use Land Use Change and Forestry (LU-
LUCF) and energy projects are required to meet
certain conditions in order to acquire Certified Emis-
sion Reductions from the Executive Board of the
CDM. Main conditions include additionality (mitiga-
tion effects ‘‘with project’’ must be additional to what
would have happened ‘‘without project’’); leakage
(project mitigation effects must not be offset by project
impacts outside the accounting boundary); and contri-
bution to sustainable development (to be demonstrated
according to host country rules). Certified Emission
Reductions represent the emission reduction or
sequestration output of a project, and constitute the
basis on which payments are made.
Brown and others (2000) state that current modal-
ities and information requirements for CDM are
beyond the scope of community capabilities and skills.
However, few studies have attempted to test the
dimensions of this alleged asymmetry between CDM
modalities and procedures and local community capa-
bilities and skills. In this paper, we seek to review this
gap by examining local community capacity for the
development and implementation of CDM projects
within Community Forests in Cameroon.
We use conceptual notions of CDM criteria and
community capacity to empirically analyse two com-
munity forestry cases in Tinto and Bimbia Bona-
dikombo, Cameroon. The intention is to identify,
document, and interpret local strategies and conditions
affecting past community forestry successes and fail-
ures, in order to recognise and understand those
factors that might enhance or limit community capacity
for CDM implementation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 high-
lights the criteria and conditions for CDM projects and
the main features of community forestry in Cameroon.
Appropriate community capacity requirements for
CDM projects are derived in section 3. Section 4
presents the methods used and the study context. In
section 5, we evaluate community capacity and draw
implications for CDM and the wider CDM/Kyoto
policy framework.
By ‘‘community’’ is meant certain characteristics
referred to in community-based natural resource
management including, having reasonably defined deci-
sion-making processes; being a homogenous unit
(sometimes ethnic) with shared goals and values; having
traditional resource use systems and livelihood strate-
gies; and also having a clear spatial or conceptual
boundary (Armitage 2005; Li 2002). While these are
good conceptual characteristics to work with, Li (2002)
sees these as very ‘‘strategic simplifications.’’ In many
instances, there is no crisp boundary between the state
and the community, communities are not homogenous,
having many individuals or groups that do not share
community resource management goals. Property rights
and decision-making systems may not also be as defined.
We thus attempt to reflect these in our discussions.
We, therefore, see community capacity as the
collective ability of individuals and groups acting in
concert toward sustainable development in a given
locality. In operational terms, community forests in
Cameroon are managed by legal entities or commu-
nity-based organisations constituted by a given ‘‘com-
munity’’ for the purpose. But first, we present the
requirements for CDM forestry projects and commu-
nity forestry modalities in Cameroon.
CDM Requirements and Community Forestry
CDM Requirements
CDM projects are expected to meet a set of require-
ments prior to the issuance of certified emission
reductions by the CDM Executive board. These
requirements are articulated in the Kyoto Protocol
and in subsequent decisions taken during the Confer-
ence and Meetings of Parties (mainly in Decisions 19/
CP.9 and 14/CP.10 and the Marrakech Accords). These
requirements can be summarised under the following
categories: additionality, acceptability, externalities,
and certification.
It suffices to mention that these rules apply to
afforestation and reforestation. These two are the only
land use land use change and forestry activities
accepted under the CDM.
Additionality
Sequestration or emission reductions due to the project
activities must be ‘‘additional’’ to any that would occur
in the absence of the project (Paragraphs 18–22 of
Decision 19/CP.9). In other words, additionality
implies that projects must result in a net storage of
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carbon and, therefore, a net removal of carbon from
the atmosphere. Other forms of additionality include
programme, financial, and investment additionality.
Programme additionality refers to project demonstra-
tion that its emission reductions are additional to
emissions required by law or government policy.
Financial additionality refers to the fact that funding
for the implementation of projects must not come from
overseas development or environment assistance
funds. Investment additionality refers to the demon-
stration that the creation of carbon offsets will involve
costs that would not be incurred in the ‘‘business as
usual’’ scenario. Though not a requirement per se, it is
a way of demonstrating ‘‘intent’’ and effort through
financial analysis.
Acceptability
The Kyoto Protocol states that all carbon offset projects
in developing countries are required to contribute to
sustainable development (Article 2.1 and 12.2). Host
countries have to have criteria for sustainable develop-
ment by which projects will be judged. In addition,
projects must be consistent with other international
agreements and guidelines such as the Convention on
Biodiversity, Agenda 21, Ramsar, and others.
Externalities (Environmental Impact and Leakage)
Projects must demonstrate a clear strategy to deal with
all impacts/effects that may arise from project imple-
mentation. These impacts could include positive or
negative social, cultural, economic, or environmental
impacts. Projects have to show how the negative
impacts would be mitigated or countered.
A prominent aspect in externalities is the question
of leakage. Leakage can be defined as unplanned
emissions that could occur outside project boundaries
as a result of project activities. Leakage should not
disqualify a project except in instances where projec-
tions of emissions are substantial enough to negate
projected carbon offsets. However, project analysis
must show how leakage has been estimated and what
measures will be put in place to minimize it.
Certification
The concreteness, measurability, and long-term charac-
teristics of the project will have to be checked indepen-
dently by a third-party (i.e., a Designated Operational
Entity) accredited by the CDM executive board. This
takes place in three stages during the CDM project cycle
namely validation, verification, and certification.
Validation is the process of independent evaluation
of project activity based on the Project Design Doc-
ument against the CDM requirements. The outcome is
the registration of the project.
Verification is the independent review process of
monitored reductions or sequestration that occurred as
a result of a registered project activity for a given
period. This is an ex-post check to confirm whether or
not and to what extent carbon offsets have actually
been attained.
Certification is the process by which the designated
operational entity gives written assurance of the
emission reductions or sequestrations achieved by
the project during a specified time period as verified.
The result is the issuance of Certified Emissions
Reductions (CERs).
Small-Scale Afforestation and Reforestation Projects
Following discussions on the complications and costs
involved in responding to the rules or requirements
outlined above, baseline, monitoring, and certification
modalities were simplified for ‘‘small-scale projects.’’
Decision 14/CP.10 defines small-scale projects as
those that will result in net anthropogenic greenhouse
gas removals by sinks of less than 8 kilo tonnes of
carbon dioxide per year during the crediting period.
However, the host country has to approve that the
project developers are a low-income community or
individuals.
Community Forests
Many authors have argued that community forest
management has the potential of fulfilling the triple
objectives of biodiversity conservation, supporting
local development, and providing forest services such
as carbon sequestration (GEF 2000; Klooster and
Masera 2000; Smith and Scherr 2003). Hence, if well
managed, it could contribute substantially to the
achievement of CDM objectives.
Furthermore, the area of forests under various forms
of community management has been increasing in the
world. White and Martin, (2002) note that 14% of
forests in the most forested countries are owned by
communities, whilst some 8% more are controlled by
communities. More forests in Cameroon are coming
under community management following new forest
legislation in 1994, introducing community forestry. By
January 2006, there were 334 applications by commu-
nities in the Ministry of Forests and Fauna (MINFOF).
Of the 334 applications, 90 community forests were
under full community management, indicating that the
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figure more than quadrupled from 17 in December
2001. At this rate, total area under community forestry
could attain 1 million hectares in five years (i.e., 200
community forests at a maximum of 5000ha).
Community forestry in Cameroon was chosen for
this study because the policy provisions for community
forestry provides a good institutional and regulatory
framework (though not sufficient) for project apprai-
sal, approval and verification by the Sub-Directorate of
community forestry in the Ministry of Forests and
Fauna (Minang and others 2007). Rules and regula-
tions are elaborated in the Manual of Procedures and
Norms for the Management of Community Forests
(MINEF 1998). No other forest management type in
Cameroon has such a regulatory framework. We
briefly present the concept of community forestry in
Cameroon in the following paragraphs.
Community Forest is defined as ‘‘that part of non-
permanent forest estate (not more than 5000ha) that is
the object of an agreement between government and a
community in which communities undertake sustain-
able forest management for a period of 25 years
renewable’’ (MINEF 1998).
Government approves a community forest applica-
tion and signs a management agreement upon com-
munity fulfilment of the following requirements,
• The community has constituted a legal entity and
appointed a community forest manager who shall
represent them in negotiations with government in
matters of community forestry;
• The community has delineated and mapped the
intended community forest area;
• The community has completed an 8–10% inventory
of the timber, non-timber forest products, and
wildlife of the forest;
• The community has provided a description of
previous activities carried out in the intended forest
area;
• The community presents a simple management
plan for the intended forest; and
• The community shows proof of stakeholder agree-
ment on the intentions of forest management.
Once the management agreement is signed, policy
requirements are as follows:
• That 100 % inventories are carried out in the
compartments prior to the commencement of
activities;
• The management of community forests provide
annual activity plans for approval;
• The management of community forests provide
annual reports to government; and
• The community forest management plans are
reviewed every five years.
Many community forests in Cameroon are a mix of
natural and secondary forests. Some cocoa agroforests
are also found within community forests as well.
Therefore, a broad spectrum of activities including
regeneration, afforestation, logging, and non-timber
forest product collection is implemented within com-
munity forests.
However, current CDM rules only accept affores-
tation and reforestation type forestry; therefore,
natural forest management by communities is not
eligible. But the possibility exists that forest manage-
ment could be taken up by the Kyoto protocol in the
future (post 2012) under different rules (Santili and
others, 2005).
Private individuals, companies, or government own
most current CDM projects institutions where deci-
sion-making and management are likely to have more
structure and simplicity. Community ownership and
management is complex and problematic in terms of
resource tenure, project responsibilities, benefit allo-
cation, and governance aspects. CDM rules have not
been tested in those complex communities that har-
bour tremendous biosphere carbon management po-
tential.
Community Capacity Assessment Framework
Project developers are required to put forth arguments
and supporting evidence for each CDM requirement in
a Project Design Document. Special knowledge, skills,
technology, and infrastructure are also needed for
collecting and analysing the required evidence. Fur-
thermore, planning, coordination, and management
skills will be required in the project development
process.
In the ensuing paragraphs, we review specific tasks
of each requirement in order to elucidate dimensions
of community capacity requirements. Table 1 presents
a summary of the resulting assessment framework of
community capacity for CDM forestry projects.
Additionality: The draft tool for the demonstration
of additionality proposes a five-step screening and
analysis procedure for CDM projects including,
• Preliminary screening based on the starting date of
the project activity and the specific features of the
afforestation and reforestation activity (mapping
and map analysis, land use analysis);
• Identification of alternatives to the project activity
consistent with current laws and regulations (land
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use analysis, estimates/measurements of carbon
stocks, projections, baseline development);
• Investment/financial analysis (Internal Rates of
Return, Net Present Value, cost benefit ratio,
sensitivity analysis, etc.)
• Barrier analysis (investment, institutional, techno-
logical, cultural, social, ecological, and other kinds
of barriers); and
• Impact of CDM registration (Expected).
The above-mentioned steps are indicative of the
knowledge and skills required to provide valuable
arguments and evidence on additionality.
The draft tool for additionality also specifies that
evidence regarding land use can be provided from land
use and land cover maps and satellite images of around
1990. This means access to mapping technology as well
as other technology for measurements of soil carbon or
biomass estimation will be required. Lee (2004) con-
cludes that most of the information is technical,
requiring good knowledge and skills and technology
to collect and manage.
It can be argued that communities may hire these
services, but the costs can be very high. Recent studies
in Tanzania revealed that costs for carbon inventories
done by communities (with minimal supervision)
would be 10 times, or more, cheaper than when experts
are contracted (Zahabu 2006). Community inventory
costs ranged between 2.5 and 21 $/ha/yr. Transaction
costs for afforestation and reforestation have been
estimated at between $8–31/tC (Poffenberger and
others 2002) and $0–70 /tC (de Jong and others 2000).
Eligibility: Demonstrating compliance with national
sustainable development rules involves engagement
with the national authorities and providing evidence.
For community forestry in Cameroon, ‘‘sustainability’’
implies creating a legal entity, ensuring participation,
developing a simple management plan, and developing
a benefit sharing mechanism. Technical expertise and
resources (financial and material) are thus required to
provide the evidence.
Externalities: Environmental impact assessments
and social impact assessments are required of each
project. The project is also required to show how they
will mitigate or solve any negative impacts identified by
studies. The same holds for leakage. Relevant knowl-
edge and skills as well as resources are thus required to
carry out these studies and design mitigation measures.
Certification: A monitoring plan must be provided
for all the variables estimated in the project design
document. This requires a demonstration of how
information would be collected and archived to enable
validation and verification by the designated opera-
tional entity. The data collection, processing, storage,
retrieval, and sharing with the operational entities
demand a certain level of data and information
infrastructure. The term data or information infra-
structure means the relevant base collection of tech-
nologies, policies, and institutional arrangements that
facilitate the availability of and access to data relevant
for the implementation of carbon forestry.
Negotiations, contracting services, and communica-
tion with the operational entities involve costs and
specific skills. Ecosecurities (2002) estimates the costs of
validation at between $18,900 and $37800 and verifica-
tion costs at about $9400 per audit. Prototype Carbon
Fund cost estimates are slightly higher (Lee 2004).
Management Capabilities and Conditions: Though
not a direct CDM requirement, management remains a
critical success factor for CDM projects, hence it is
being incorporated by operational entities in validation
processes. Nelson and de Jong (2003) demonstrate the
importance of institutional arrangements in rule set-
ting, enforcement, and monitoring for carbon forestry
projects in Chiapas, Mexico. Poffenberger and others
(2002) cite interalia, effective institutions, democratic
leadership, transparency in decision-making and public
expenditures, and minimizing social conflicts as impor-
tant success factors for community carbon forestry.
Subak (2000) also underscores the role of governments
and NGOs in providing technical and institutional
support for carbon mitigation projects in Costa Rica.
FERN (2000) reported conflicts resulting from re-
source tenure perceptions that created serious prob-
lems for a carbon project in East Africa.
Based on the preceding paragraphs, we raise key
questions for community capacity assessment under
the four CDM requirements. We also include a
category on Management capabilities and condi-
tions—see Table 1 (Ivey and others 2004). The various
issues discussed in this framework are interrelated;
hence, we try to show these interactions as much as
possible based on our empirical evidence.
Methods and Context
Methods
This study aims at evaluating community capacity to
meet CDM conditions. To do so, we create a frame-
work (Table 1) and seek empirical evidence by way of
case studies. We identified two communities in Cam-
eroon for the study: Tinto and Bimbia Bonadikombo
(hereinafter called Bimbia). The choice of these
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communities was based on the willingness to provide
data and the relative homogeneity/heterogeneity and
accessibility of the communities. All three villages in
Tinto and four villages in Bimbia are typical small rural
livelihood-based settings, while two settlements in
Bimbia are relatively larger and peri-urban. The fact
that these cases were not initially conceived for CDM
purposes constitutes a limitation in the study.
Data collection tools included semi-structured inter-
views (19), structured-interviews/questionnaires (84),
focus group discussions (6), secondary data review, and
forest transect walks. Given the substantive nature of
the dimensions of community capacity, more discursive
data collection tools were selected (Frankfort-Nach-
mias and Nachmias 1996; Yin 1994). Questionnaires
were used for selected community resource persons to
understand the relevant community knowledge and
skills pool. Data sources included community forest
legal entities, Ministry staff, traditional authorities,
NGO staff, community/user groups, and municipal
authorities. Documents analysed included various
planning, monitoring, seizure, and study reports. Inter-
views were used to obtain insight and check the
information from secondary sources and other tools.
Thematic and issue based content analysis was used to
analyse the transcripts and secondary information for
answers to questions in the community capacity
assessment framework.
The Empirical Setting
The Tinto community consists of three neighbouring
villages of the same clan namely Bessinghe, Kerieh,
and Mbu. The total population of between 1700–2000
is very homogenous with less than 1% ‘‘outsiders.’’ It is
typically rural, but is an administrative (District)
headquarters with a forestry office. Most farmers grow
cocoa or coffee as cash crops, alongside cassava, maize,
and other subsistence crops. Forest activities include
hunting, collecting non-timber forest products, and
timber. Tinto began a community forest planning
process in November 1999 and signed a management
agreement with government for an evergreen lowland
forest area of 1295 ha in December 2002. But little has
happened by way of management to date.
The Bimbia Bonadikombo community is a complex
of many villages namely, Mbonjo, Chopfarm, Banan-
gombe, Bonabile, Dikolo, Mabeta, Ombe Native
(Bamukong), Bonadikombo, and several plantation
worker camps. Two of these settlements (Bonabile and
Dikolo) are larger and peri-urban in character and
located on the fringes of the Limbe (Victoria) town
(see Fig. 1). Limbe and the surrounding areas have a
population of about 123,900 inhabitants (RCDC 2002).
It is highly heterogeneous with few local people (of the
Bakweri tribe). Forest extraction activities in order of
importance include collection of non-timber forest
products, fuel wood and timber, charcoal burning and
hunting. The community has been managing a 3700–ha
forest since mid 2002. Vegetation is evergreen with
different types: littoral vegetation, mangrove, freshwa-
ter swamp forest, stream and riverside vegetation, and
lowland rainforest.
Community Forest Actors
A nested institutional structure can be observed in
both the Tinto and Bimbia communities. There are
user groups, community-based organisations created
for community forest management purposes, and
traditional authorities, all of which are moulded and
developed within the locality. These organisations
Table 1 CDM community capacity assessment framework
CDM requirement Community Capacity requirements
Additionality Does the community have access to adequate financial resources for baseline and other analysis?
Does community have access to required technology for data collection and analysis?
Does community have access to necessary human resources (knowledge and skills)?
Acceptability Are the necessary national sustainable development policy analysis knowledge and skills available within the
community?
Externalities Are the necessary impact assessment and leakage analysis knowledge and skills available within the
community?
Certification How adequate is the community forest monitoring system?
How adequate is the community information infrastructure?
Is the relevant CDM information (forest inventory, socio-economic) available?
Does community have required financial resources to engage Designated Operational Entities?
Management
Capability
Are actors effectively participating in decision-making and implementation?
How effectively are resource rules being implemented?
How good are actor relationships in forest management?
Are communities receiving adequate government and NGO support?
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work closely with the forest administration and NGOs.
Table 2 presents a summary of actors, their interests
and responsibilities within community forests in these
communities.
The makeup of institutional structures differs
slightly between the two communities and some actors
such as charcoal burners are only found in the Bimbia
community. It is worth noting that forest use and
livelihood activities often involve combinations of
activities. But we present the actors in terms of forest
use activities in order to capture specific issues that
could otherwise be diluted in the analysis of various
activity combinations.
Assessing Community Capacity for CDM project
development
In this section, we evaluate community capacity in the
light of CDM requirements and the corresponding
community capacity requirements (Table 1), including
mainly additionality, acceptability, externalities, certi-
fication and management capabilities and conditions.
(Table 5) provides a summary of the findings.
Additionality
The key additionality capacity question to address is
whether or not communities have access to the
financial, technological and human resources required
to fulfil additionality requirements.
In terms of financial resources, total annual income
in 2005 for Bimbia stood at $31, 200 (see Table 3). At
the end of that year, Bimbia was running at a deficit of
about $3000. Total income in Tinto stood at $10,150.
One hundred percent of the reported income for Tinto
during this period was an advance payment for timber
exploitation. Prior to this deposit, all income for the
Tinto community forest over three years was a grant
from Living Earth amounting to $800.
Considering mitigation potential and transaction
costs for various averted deforestation, reduced
impact logging and regeneration carbon scenarios as
in Table 4, and the financial resources of both
communities, the investment requirements will
be extremely difficult if not impossible for these
Fig. 1 Location of study areas in Cameroon
Table 2 Summary description of community forestry actors
Actor Interests and Responsibility
1. Bimbia Bonadikombo Natural Resource
Management Council (BBNRMC)
Manages Bimbia forest; Has an elected Board and a Forest Management Officer
overseeing day-to-day operations
2. Tinto Clan Community Forest–Common
Initiative Group (TCCF–CIG)
Manages Tinto forest; Has an elected Management Committee and a Forest
Management Officer in charge of day-to-day operations.
3. Chiefs Village heads; custodians of forests; authorise access to all resources and land; in
both cases are members of the BBNRMC board and TCCF-CIG committee,
respectively
4. Forest User Groups Includes all user groups; interested in access rights; participate in general assemblies
of organisations; In the case of Bimbia, each user group has a representative on
the Board
5. Women in communities Interested in access rights for non-timber forest products and farmland
6. Elites ‘‘Successful’’ sons and daughters living outside the community (as defined by these
communities): interested in broad village development;
7. Ministry of Forests and Fauna (MINFOF) Mandated to ensure sustainable forest management; provide technical support;
conflict resolution
8. Municipal Authorities Interested in contributions of community forest to development of municipality
9. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Interested in sustainable forest management; provides technical, institutional, and
financial support;
Mount Cameroon Project supported Bimbia, while Living Earth Foundation
supported Tinto.
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communities without external support. Table 4 was
calculated by using a chronosequence of mean
carbon content and rates of carbon saved under
different land use options in Cameroon. We esti-
mated that the Bimbia forest could mitigate between
7–12.4 Kt C y–1 and the Tinto forest between 1.7–5.3
(see Table 4). With production potentials of less than
8 Kt Co2 y
–1 (2182 tC y–1), both projects could
qualify for small-scale CDM. This means they can
reduce transaction costs by up to 50%. Yet with the
current financial situation, they are unlikely to meet
the investment requirements.
Community forestry as practiced in both communi-
ties is multi-activity and can entail prohibitive negoti-
ation costs (Smith and Scherr 2003). De Jong and
others (2000) reported costs of participation, negotia-
tion, and conflict prevention in the Scolel Te project in
southern Mexico ranging from $52–325/ha. Such costs
and those to be incurred on impact prediction, valida-
tion, and verification are not part of the concessions on
small-scale CDM projects, yet these costs in them-
selves could be prohibitive to CDM project uptake and
development.
Secondly, an analysis of pre-2005 financial records in
both communities revealed they received overseas
development assistance for community forestry imple-
mentation (11.70% of income for Bimbia and 100% for
Tinto; Table 3). Because communities received over-
seas development assistance for completely different
project purposes, they may become ineligible under the
financial additionality criterion.
Technical resources such as satellite images, GPSs,
and tree height measurement instruments would be
helpful in providing information required for baseline
estimation. None of these communities have direct
access to satellite images or facilities to process them.
Bimbia can access images through the GIS unit of
nearby Mount Cameroon Botanic Gardens and Con-
servation Centre. But they have to pay for it. Access to
free satellite data from the Internet would be difficult
given the very weak connectivity services in the region.
Bimbia has one GPS that can allow them to map
current land use. Tinto has a compass that can be
useful for inventories.
The human resources required for related addition-
ality analysis is currently limited in both communities.
Fourteen Bimbia and 11 Tinto community members
received training on timber inventories during the
process of developing the simple management plans.
The main skills acquired included doing physiological
measurements (tree heights, dbh), using the compass
and or the GPS, tree identification, and laying out
sample plots and transects. But the skills required for
carbon estimation are more complex, including bio-
mass estimation, using allometric equations, root bio-
mass estimation, measuring trees of all diameters,
destructive sampling, and so on. These technical
carbon estimation skills are absent in both communi-
ties.
Skills for financial and investment analysis are
absent in these communities. One of the staff in
Bimbia has basic undergraduate course knowledge in
cost-benefit analysis but this is not enough. The
community would thus have to hire such services at
high costs. In Tinto, no one had such skills and
knowledge.
Acceptability
The main capacity question in the acceptability crite-
rion is do communities have the knowledge and
skills to provide evidence of project contribution to
sustainable development? According to the current
community forestry regulations, ‘‘sustainability’’ is
demonstrated by the development of a simple man-
agement plan, a viable legal entity, a benefit-sharing
mechanism, and planned community projects (MINEF
1998). Both communities fulfilled these conditions,
thanks to previous financial and technical assistance
from NGOs and projects (McCall and Minang 2005).
Mount Cameroon Project helped Bimbia while Living
Earth Foundation assisted Tinto. Hence, we can say
Table 3 Estimated income and expenditure of community for-
ests (January–December 2005)
Description Bimbia
Bonadikombo
Tinto
Income
Total
(XAF/USD)
14,867,000/
30200
5,000,000a/
10150
From forest
operations- wood (%)
28.5 100
From grants/donations (%) 10.4 0
From service delivery
(ecotourism and
tree care services to Urban
Council (%)
23 0
Fines and auction sales (%) 19.1 0
Loans (%) 18.8 0
Expenditure
Total (XAF/USD) 15,910,000/
32300
940,000/1900
Operational costs, Office (%) 11 100
Operational costs, Field (%) 23.4 0
Salaries (%) 62.8 0
Investments (%) 0 0
a This amount represents a deposit made by a potential timber
exploiter in November 2005, as proof of liquidity
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that both communities adhere to the sustainable
development criteria that exist.
However, problems may emerge if national sustain-
ability criteria for CDM eventually include interna-
tional environmental conventions.
Externalities
The key capacity question addressed below is do
communities have the knowledge and skills for the
required impact assessment and leakage analyses.
Five persons (three employees and two board
members) in Bimbia have at least undergraduate
knowledge and some experience of environmental
and social impact assessments. This means they have
a good chance of providing the evidence required by
this criterion of the CDM. On the other hand, none
of the Tinto members had any knowledge of envi-
ronmental or social impact assessments. No respon-
dent in both communities had any understanding of
leakage.
Certification
Communities would have to collect, analyse, archive,
and eventually share information with designated
operational entities responsible for validation and
verification. Hence, the key capacity questions for
certification include, how functional are community
forestry monitoring systems? How adequate are
community information infrastructures? And do com-
munities have enough financial resources to engage
Designated Operational Entities for validation?
Monitoring and reporting mechanisms in both com-
munities suffer serious inadequacies. Monitoring and
reporting in Bimbia are characterised by monthly
management council board meetings at the managerial
level, and by forest patrols at an operational level, 186
patrols in 2005. These meetings and patrols result in
reports. However, the patrols are for the most part
erratic, triggered by tip-offs on illegal activity. In 2003,
control posts or check points that could be manned for
24 hours were made at strategic outlets from the forest,
Table 4 Projected carbon mitigation potential for community Forests
Without Project With Project Scenario 1c With Project Scenario 2c
Tinto Community
Total area (ha) 1295
Vegetation type Natural forest
Scenario description Conversion Averted DEForestation Reduced Impact Logging
(ADEF)- Conservation (RIL)
Potential area (ha)/yr 7.77 52
Carbon gain -tC ha –1a 220 104
Total carbon saving
(Kt C y –1)b
— 1.7 5.3
Bimbia Community
Total area (ha) 3714
Vegetation type Natural forest (50%) and
mixed cocoa farms and
secondary forests (50%)
Scenario description Conversion ADEF — Conservation of
natural forest/Conservation +
regeneration
Conservation + regeneration
(RIL)/conservation
+ regeneration
Potential area (ha)/Yr — 11 (ADEF)/ 928 (Conservation) 74 (RIL)/928 (Conservation)
Carbon gain -tC ha–1a — 220 (tC ha–1)/5 tC ha–1y–1 104 / 5 tC ha–1 y–1
Total carbon saving (Kt C y–1) — 2.4/4.64 7.7/4.64
7.04 12.34
a Mean Annual Carbon gain values for various project scenarios are assumed from reported studies in Cameroon as follows: ADEF
(Kotto-Same and others 1997), RIL (Justice and others 2001), and Regeneration (Palm and others 2000).
b Total carbon savings are given as
P
(Carbon gain · potential area)
c General Scenario assumptions are:
• Secondary forests are made available for conservation and regeneration
• There will be no fires, droughts or disasters during the project lifetime
• Illegal logging will be minimal and not sufficient to significantly affect project
• Forest areas do not include roads, water bodies and minor human settlements
• Exercise of usufruct rights for subsistence purposes including fuel wood, and non timber forest product harvesting is unlikely to
significantly affect carbon flows
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but were later abandoned by the operation committee
members. It is alleged that the control posts system did
not give the room for corrupt practices desired by some
operation committee members, hence, the abandon-
ment. Some of them negotiate and collect fines from
defaulters without the knowledge of the management
officer. In extreme cases, they cooperate with illegal
timber exploiters. In the case of Tinto, no monitoring
or reporting of any sort has been done since December
2002 when the management agreement was signed.
Table 5 Summary of findings
Requirement Bimbia Bonadikombo Tinto
Additionality
Access to
financial
resources
Insufficient financial resources. Deficit of $3000 in 2005
accounts; Little experience with high interest loans;
Eligibility unlikely due to use of ODA funds in forestry
implementation
Insufficient financial resources. Functioning for past three
years with $784 in total; No experience with loans;
Eligibility unlikely due to use of ODA funds in forestry
development.
Knowledge
and skills
Limited knowledge and skills. One person with
undergraduate knowledge of cost benefit analysis and
none in investment or financial analysis methods.
Fourteen employees have knowledge and skills in
timber inventories only.
Knowledge and skills are extremely limited. No
knowledge or experience of financial or investment
analysis in community. Eleven people have knowledge
and skills in timber inventories only.
Access to
technology
Little or no access to satellite data and other technologies
required.
Same as in Bimbia
Acceptability
Knowledge
and Skills
Community fulfilled ‘‘sustainability’’ criteria in the
development of management plans with NGO support.
Hence have some relevant experience.
Same as in Bimbia
Externalities
Environmental
impact and
leakage
Three members in community have knowledge skills and
experience in environmental and social impact
assessment, therefore good potential
No knowledge or skills in environmental or social impact
assessment observed
No knowledge or understanding of leakage observed Same as in Bimbia
Certification
Monitoring
systems
Monitoring systems are functional, but inadequate for
CDM because they do not involve ongoing inventories;
Short of manpower (ratio of staff to forest area is 1:285
ha)
No documented evidence of monitoring. The lone staff
cannot ensure any proper monitoring for an area of
1 295ha.
Information
system
Both physical and digital Information systems
(computers) are operational. This can allow for
‘‘sharability’’; hence, the system is potentially
adaptable to CDM archiving requirements.
Information system consists of two cardboard folders.
Hence, inadequate in form, content, and quality for
CDM purposes.
CDM
Information
availability
Some relevant geographical, socio-economic, ecological,
and general information is available for CDM use
within current systems. But much more is required
Same as in Bimbia
Financial
resources
Inadequate financial resources to pay for validation
services
Same as in Bimbia
Management Capability
Actor
relationships
Conflicts exist, (i) between 6 chiefs and management
board of community forest; (ii) between
community—MINFOF over 14 permits and proceeds
from auctioning of seizures; and (iii) between farmers
and forest management.
Conflicts between 3 chiefs and management officer.
Forestry rules
enforcement
Illegal activity income accounts for about 67% of income
from legal forest activities and 19% of total revenue in
2005. It is significant and poses threats to the success of
potential carbon project.
No illegal activity observed. Rules are being respected.
Government
community
relationship
Government short of forestry personal (staff to forest
area ratio in the province is about 1:1500ha);
Government staff do not understand the CDM and
have no relevant skills to support communities
Same as in Bimbia
NGO–
community
relationship
The Cameroon Mountain Conservation Foundation
(CAMCOF) is interested in providing support for
carbon forestry in the area, but lack the knowledge,
skills and resources.
Living Earth Foundation is interested in providing
support for carbon forestry in the community, but lacks
the knowledge, skills and resources.
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The community explains that with ‘‘zero’’ activities in
the community forest, there is no reason to report.
Given that these monitoring systems were not meant
for CDM projects, they would need to be overhauled if
these projects are to be registered within the CDM.
However, the corruption and institutional planning
problems currently experienced would still pose seri-
ous difficulties for CDM monitoring.
Neither community has conducted post-manage-
ment agreement forest surveys or inventories of
designated exploitation compartments as required by
law. They have equally failed to convene general
assemblies of stakeholders to discuss and review
progress as their statutes demand since the commence-
ment of community forest activities.
Community information systems were found in both
cases to have relevant biophysical, socio-economic, and
market data that could be used for further analysis on
impact, baselines, leakage, and other CDM require-
ments. However, inventory data available to these
community forests are inadequate for carbon estimation
as they were done for timber exploitation as required by
extant community forestry rules. Most of these studies
were done with the help of NGOs prior to the manage-
ment agreement. As demonstrated in the preceding
text, further collection of complementary data for CDM
without such assistance may be less reliable because
communities do not have adequate skills.
Material and technological resources (infrastructure)
can tremendously influence project information man-
agement. Bimbia currently has limited office space
within the premises of the Divisional Office for Limbe.
They have four operational computers and a digital
filling system for all reports. Hard copies of reports are
stored on shelves totalling about four metres in length.
With a motorbike, 12 staff and little funds to hire cars
regularly, transportation is a serious hindrance to
monitoring efforts. In Tinto, activities are run from the
forest manager’s house. All information for the Tinto
community forest is found in two cardboard folders.
Management Capability and Conditions
In this section, we examine the extent to which
community decision-making processes, rules compli-
ance, actor relationships, and relationships with gov-
ernment and NGOs are adequate for carbon project
development.
Participation and Decision-making
Involving actors in building consensus and decision-
making for CDM project implementation is important
for local communities (de Jong and others 2000; Smith
and Scherr 2003). Participation in decision-making is
largely by actor representation in the decision-making
bodies within the legal entities managing the forests on
behalf of the communities. The management board in
Bimbia is made up of chiefs, elected user group
representatives, and some employees such as the forest
manager. It meets on average 10 times a year.
Attendance sheets show charcoal burners as the only
consistent user group participating at these meetings.
Timber exploiters and the fuel wood harvesters have
been persistently absent. Latent power struggles within
the leadership have weakened decision-making pro-
cesses. The six chiefs in Bimbia sent a letter to the
acting forest manager complaining that they were not
being sufficiently consulted on day-to-day forest man-
agement issues such as issuance of permits (Letter of
January 2005).
In Tinto, the management committee is made of all
three chiefs, village representatives, and the forest
manager. It has met about five times since December
2002. Interviewees reported about four ad hoc meet-
ings between the manager, two chiefs, and one board
member for consultation on proposals for sale of
standing volume within the community forest between
2003 and 2005. Power struggles over money have also
weakened decision-making in Tinto. All three chiefs in
Tinto complain of not being consulted by the manager
especially on financial issues. Given observed actor
reactions and comments during informal discussions, it
is our reasoned judgement that this is an important
issue, which contributed to the inertia in the take off of
community forestry activities in Tinto. These systems
still harbour many weaknesses that may inhibit con-
sensus-building processes for carbon forestry.
Annual general assemblies in which popular com-
munity participation is expected have not been con-
vened in either case since mid-2002, implying that
actors have not had the opportunity to participate in
more strategic decision-making in community forestry.
Implementation of Community Forestry Rules
An assessment of community forestry rules compliance
produced mixed results. In Bimbia, annual legal timber
exploitation has been between 500 to 700m3. About
5000 trees have been planted in two of three compart-
ments envisaged in the management plan. There has
also been good cooperation with charcoal burners in
the implementation of management rules.
However, in Bimbia the rules have also been
seriously flouted. Deforestation and degradation has
been accelerated by farming and illegal timber exploi-
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tation. Illegal fuel wood harvesting is rife in the
accessible southeast and western compartments of the
forest. For example, in 2005, 186 forest monitoring
patrols were conducted. During these patrols, the
following were confiscated, 49 chain saws, 2000 kg of
charcoal (100 bags of about 100 kg), 301 small fuel
wood chunks, and 1254 sawn timber boards of various
sizes (4 · 8 cm; 4 · 12 cm. etc.). Income from fines and
sales of confiscated products amounted to about $5700
(2, 840, 000 XAF), representing about 67% of total
income from about 655m3 of legal logging from the
Bimbia forest. These numbers are explained by easy
accessibility to the Bimbia forest, which is located a
few kilometres from Limbe town.
The Tinto community had agreed to exploit 2000 m3
of timber annually from the forest. But in three years
nothing has happened. They advance the absence of an
access road and lack of start-up resources as reasons
for the inertia. Negotiations for timber exploitation are
ongoing. The above evidence suggests many potential
inadequacies regarding rules compliance for carbon
forestry.
Actor Relations
Good actor relationships are necessary for success in
carbon forestry. Figure 2 presents the state of rela-
tionships between the actors in the Tinto and Bimbia
communities. The figure was developed mainly from
interviews and secondary data, and discussed and
validated with other actors especially those not inter-
viewed.
Varied land tenure perceptions have affected the
actor relationships in community forestry implementa-
tion in Bimbia. In Bimbia, it was agreed with the
representatives of all actors during the land use plan
and the simple management plan phases that each
farmer within the forest would pay a registration fee of
2000FCFA ($3.5), after which his or her farm would be
assessed and annual rents determined. Less than 100 of
the estimated 1000 farmers have registered. Farmers
think registration is only a pretext and that rents might
eventually be prohibitive, thereby kicking them out.
They emphasise that the spirit of pre-community forest
indigenous organisations such as the Victoria Lands
and Forest Conservation and the Victoria Area Rain-
forest Common Initiative Group that aimed at ejecting
‘‘non-native usurpers’’ from their forest still prevails.
Such land tenure perceptions and issues of trust explain
the poor relationships between the management coun-
cil and farmers or fuel wood collectors (Fig. 2) espe-
cially because many users of the forest are non-native.
Relations between communities and government can
influence community project development and risk
management in terms of enabling training and improv-
ing access to resources and technology. It could also
stifle progress when conflicts arise in their relationship.
Community forestry policy stipulates that the Min-
istry of Forests and Fauna (MINFOF) is supposed to
provide technical support to communities in forestry
activities, but working relationships have been poor in
both cases. Poor working relationships arise partly
from lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities. The
Bimbia community accuses MINFOF of illegally issu-
ing about 14 logging permits within their forest, and
lack of transparency with auction sale dues from joint
seizures. MINFOF says Bimbia has no right to sanction
defaulters while Bimbia insists the law allows them to
deal with minor offences. The line between major and
minor is not clear even for the neutral interpreter of
policy. These examples of disagreements have created
conflicts between the community and forest adminis-
tration staff (see Fig. 2).
It is clear that communities will need external
assistance with complex carbon measurement and
monitoring tasks such as the use of allometric equa-
Fig. 2 Sociogram showing
community forest actor
relationships in both
communities
123
626 Environ Manage (2007) 39:615–630
tions, soil laboratory measurements, access to remote
sensing technology, and information management. This
would be expected from MINFOF, but the question is
whether this government body is in a position to
provide such assistance. To start with, technological
knowhow and resources are in short supply in this
government department. Existing allometric equations
were developed for known marketable timber species
only. Available and useful remote sensing and GIS
data are limited to 1950 and 1991 aerial photographs
covering some forest areas in the country. These could
be used as evidence for land use and land cover for
critical date requirements for CDM, i.e., December 31,
1989, for example. Staff and resources in the ministry
are inadequate for supporting communities (Ekoko
2000). The ratio of staff to forest area in the southwest
province, in which both Tinto and Bimbia are located,
is about 1:15000ha. A senior forestry official acknowl-
edged that they are so badly equipped that they
sometimes ask for transportation or material support
from communities in the fulfilment of their tasks. Staffs
in most cases have little knowledge of carbon issues.
Relations between communities and NGOs have
been good. NGOs or bilateral projects have provided
the support communities’ need for forest management.
For example, in Bimbia, Mount Cameroon Project
(GTZ-DFID funded) facilitated workshops on com-
munity forestry regulations and helped with the estab-
lishment of the legal entity. It also financed hired
expertise for the training of community members and
subsequent implementation of mapping, forest inven-
tories, and the development of simple management
plans. Living Earth Foundation used a similar ap-
proach in the case of Tinto. This support by NGOs
continued through the entire community forestry-
planning process and the early stages of implementa-
tion (late 2003 to early 2004).
But very often these NGOs have been using
overseas development assistance funds. Such funds
may not be acceptable under the CDM given the
financial additionality criterion. This makes a compel-
ling argument for the creation of a national fund to
support CDM project development.
A summary of the findings is presented in Table 5.
While the synthesis shows that communities have
benefited in terms of income, knowledge, and skills
acquisition and employment, it also reveals serious
inadequacies in human, financial, and technological
resources required for successful community forestry
implementation. In comparative terms, Bimbia fared
better with regards to resources. Perhaps Tinto’s
remote location and relatively smaller size explains
the difference in resource availability.
Regarding management capability and conditions, a
mix of similarities and differences can be noted. In
similarities, both communities have received NGO
support and have also had conflicts with forest admin-
istration on various issues. In differences, Bimbia has
experienced substantial internal conflicts, high levels of
illegal activity, forest degradation, and staff corruption.
In Tinto, the forest has remained intact due to the
absence of activities, owing mainly to the remoteness of
the area, and lack of startup resources and entrepre-
neurship. These differences illustrate that local com-
munity capacity is a result of the unique manner in
which these attributes coalesce in particular places and,
therefore, should also be seen to a very large extent on a
case-by-case basis (Agrawal 2001; Armitage 2005).
Conclusions and Practical Implications
Several studies have supported payment for environ-
mental services within the commons as an emerging
model of sustainable development for poor communi-
ties. Yet community capacity to implement such
models often falls short of expectations. This paper
set out to assess the capacity of communities to
implement CDM projects in Cameroon. From experi-
ences of success and failure in community forest
implementation, we draw conclusions on the implica-
tions for CDM implementation within community
forestry setups, i.e., in the case where communities
currently managing forests decide to add on carbon
sequestration as another land use.
Analysing the dimensions and determinants of
community capacity for CDM in both the Bimbia
and Tinto cases points to substantial inadequacies. It
indicates that taking up CDM carbon management
procedures complicates the challenges of local com-
munities already grappling with huge community forest
management difficulties within host country modalities
and procedures. The inadequacies revealed serve as
good arguments for varying dimensions of additionality
in the CDM certification process. But more impor-
tantly however, evidence from the Bimbia and Tinto
cases, though limited, also points to a number of
generalizable observations on community capacity to
manage terrestrial CDM projects.
Firstly, proactive capacity-building measures are
needed to increase project uptake in poor countries.
Our case studies highlight evidence that local commu-
nities lack the knowledge, skills, and technical and
financial resources to accommodate current CDM
rules. Management capabilities and conditions are also
deficient in many ways. Tasks for baseline estimation,
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investment, financial, environmental and social impact,
and leakage analysis cannot be met under poor
community conditions in Cameroon and many parts
of sub-Saharan Africa. This evidence supports previous
explanations for why Africa is lagging behind in CDM
project development, i.e., currently accounting only for
1.7% of all projects in the CDM pipeline (Desanker
2005). This raises serious questions about the potential
of CDM contributing to sustainable development in its
current form.
Due attention should, therefore, be given to multi-
ple partnership arrangements and most especially to
NGO capacity for supporting CDM implementation
processes (Nelson and de Jong 2003). The Bimbia and
Tinto cases point to the potential role NGOs can play
in enabling project uptake and development. However,
any community capacity approach for CDM needs to
carefully consider tasks to be undertaken by commu-
nities and those to be undertaken by external agencies
or consultants. This is because NGOs or consultants
are developing many energy projects within the CDM
and in some cases they get paid a proportion of the
anticipated credits. Replicating such a scenario in
CDM forestry could mean ignoring local competencies,
thereby diverting vital community benefits in the form
of credits. Sharing such roles and responsibilities
especially vis-a`-vis project developers and other part-
ners could help reduce conflicts and facilitate institu-
tional relations and hence resource governance. This
could be beneficial for the development of other
environmental services systems for water catchments
or biodiversity.
Secondly, managing actor relationships as influenced
by their motivations, perceptions, and resources, within
multiple use forestry projects, is a great challenge
regarding risk of project failure, leakage, and costs of
CDM projects. Involving actors in building consensus
and compliance is difficult and costly for local com-
munities (de Jong and others 2000; Smith and Scherr
2003). The knowledge and facilitation skills required
are enormous, therefore taking on carbon as another
community forestland use will compound the knowl-
edge and skills demands. Such evidence should support
the prioritization of institutional capacity building for
developing countries called for in Decision FCCC/CP/
2004/L.11, and other documents within the Subsidiary
Body for Implementation capacity building framework
of the Kyoto Protocol.
Thirdly, this research brings a number of cross-scale
CDM issues to the fore. It shows that community
capacity depends on and is part of a forest/land use
policy framework. The CDM framework assumes that
the necessary macro-institutional and regulatory sup-
port for micro-level implementation would be avail-
able. This study found out that neither sustainable
development criteria nor supportive institutions and
personnel exist in Cameroon.
Developing national CDM guidelines for both for-
estry and energy projects might be a necessary (but not
sufficient) condition for CDM project development at a
local level. It can be beneficial in providing institutional
structure and for specifying critical standards on impact
assessment, monitoring, measures preventing risk of
project failure, and information management for CDM
forestry projects. This supports earlier contentions that
some regulation may be required to reduce livelihood
risks and increase social benefits (Smith and others
2003; Minang and others 2007)
Supporting Designated National Authorities and
allied ministerial services to provide proactive capacity
building to poor communities is imperative for Kyoto
Protocol processes if CDM is to succeed. This could
help provide badly needed support from government
institutions in the areas of resource/incentive provision,
training, information management, monitoring, and
marketing. Costa Rica is an example of a non-annex 1
country that has instituted proactive measures of this
kind (FAO 2004; Subak 2000). An opportunity exists
for the creation of a national fund to support CDM
projects to help provide startup funds for communities
in Cameroon. Such a fund could tap from the coffers of
the Special Forestry Development Fund, a mechanism
that enables a proportion of forestry tax revenues to be
reinvested into forestry development. Putting such
funds into capacity building and not project imple-
mentation could be justifiable under the CDM.
Finally, there is a need for a rethinking of current
CDM forestry modalities. Current rules are complex,
unfeasible, and unfairly beyond the capacity of poor
communities such as those assessed in this study, thus
confirming previous conclusions in Brown and others
(2000) and Poffenberger and others (2002). It may also
explain (at least in part) why India, China, Brazil, and
Mexico combined hosted 83% of all CDM projects,
while Africa hosted only 2% by June 2006. Provisions
for small-scale CDM forestry projects are not far-
reaching enough. They do not currently consider basic
environmental and social impact and community
negotiations costs, but our research demonstrates that
they pose equally strong challenges to CDM project
development even in instances where less than the
small-scale threshold mitigation value of 8 kt C y–1
applies. If the sustainable development objectives of
the CDM and the Kyoto Protocol must be attained in
the poorest countries, further consideration should be
given to CDM modalities in the ongoing post-2012
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forestry negotiations. This study and others provide a
growing body of evidence on community capacity for
carbon forestry that could help in the development of
more realistic and equitable CDM rules.
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